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Abstract
This paper investigates how bank proﬁtability is aﬀected by the
corporate income tax (CIT). For this purpose it uses aggregate data
of the banking sector of the main industrialized countries, for the
period 1980-2003. The main novelties with respect to the existing
literature are two. First, it explicitly considers that the CIT is not
speciﬁc to the banking sector so that changes in CIT rate can aﬀect
both banks and borrowing ﬁrms. With the help of a simple theoretical
model we derive a set of predictions about the impact of the CIT on
banks’ income statement. Second, we consider all main components of
banks’ proﬁt and loss accounts: net interest income, interest expenses,
non-interest income, operating costs, and provisions. In this way, we
are able to disentangle the extent to which a bank is able to shift
its tax-burden forward to its lenders, depositors, and purchasers of
fee-generating services.
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11 Introduction
The issues related to the taxation of ﬁnancial intermediaries are of great
interest because the banking sector plays a crucial role in the allocation of
resources and the growth process. Nevertheless, as noted by Caminal (2004),
most of the attention of economic research has been devoted to the eﬀects of
liberalization of the ﬁnancial industry, privatization of banks, optimal design
of the regulatory environment; on the contrary, bank taxation has received
relatively little attention, in spite of the fact that it is often a signiﬁcant
source of tax revenue in many countries. Interest in the taxation of ﬁnan-
cial ﬁrms has been recently increasing in connection with policy issues in
the European Union, where the attempt of creating a common market for
banking services has not yet achieved satisfactory results despite massive
deregulation. In this respect, it has been argued that the persistent segmen-
tation of national markets can also be connected with diﬀerences in the ﬁscal
treatment of resident banks (Huizinga, 2003).
This paper focuses on the eﬀects of the corporate income tax on bank
proﬁtability.1 We take into account possible interactions between the banking
and the ﬁrm sector: an increase in the corporate income tax rate could modify
loan and deposit demand schedules, so that banks’ prices are modiﬁed taking
into account this eﬀect. For this reason it is diﬃcult to establish a priori
what is the total eﬀect on bank margins, that will depend upon demand and
supply elasticities.2 This eﬀect can be inﬂuenced also by institutional and
other credit market characteristics. In particular, economic theory suggests
that the possibility for a bank to shift an increase in the tax burden to its
customers directly depends on the competitiveness of the market in which it
operates. The analysis should therefore take into account the great changes
due to the eﬀect of deregulation over time.
The literature stresses the fact that corporate income tax distorts the
capital structure and raises the average cost of capital. In the case of banks
the eﬀects of corporate taxes are quite diﬀerent since banks are subject to
regulation that inﬂuences their liability structure. For example, in the pres-
ence of a minimum capital requirement, substitution eﬀects between equity
1Although the ﬁnancial sector is subject to general income taxation, with regard to
other forms of taxes, in most countries it receives a special treatment. For instance,
ﬁnancial services are often exempted by VAT, mainly in connection with diﬃculties in
measuring value added (De Bonis, Monacelli and Pazienza, 2005); banks enjoy below-cost
deposit insurance and bailouts in cases of ﬁnancial collapse. On the other hand, banks
bear special taxes such as unremunerated reserve requirements (Fama, 1980) and serve as
tax collecting subsidiaries of their clients (withholding taxes on the capital income). For
a complete analysis of the taxation of ﬁnancial ﬁrms see Monacelli and Pazienza, 2005.
2For a general reference on the issue of tax shifting, see Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980.
2and other forms of ﬁnancing are very limited for a bank (Gambacorta and
Mistrulli, 2004). This means that after a reduction of the CIT rate, loan
supply may simply reduce as it would happen with any other ﬁrm after an
increase of the marginal cost.
The macroeconomic consequences of a tax-shift are analyzed in the the-
ories of ﬁscal repression (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999); this part of
the literature stresses the fact that the growth possibilities of an economy
are largely aﬀected by the size and eﬃciency of its ﬁnancial sector, which
govern the capital accumulation and allocation processes. Nevertheless, it is
reasonable to presume that the importance of the distortions generated by
the taxation of ﬁnancial services are closely dependent on whether who is
actually carrying the tax burden is the bank or its customers.
This paper studies the link between bank proﬁtability and taxation by
using data for ten industrialized countries over the period 1981-2003. The
dataset includes yearly ﬁgures from the balance sheet and income statement
of aggregated national banking industries reconstructed on a comparable ba-
sis using OECD and national central banks data. Data are collected and
treated in an harmonized way that minimizes the eﬀects of diﬀerences in ac-
counting and statistical deﬁnitions and allows meaningful comparison across
countries. It’s worth stressing that OECD data area collected on an indi-
vidual basis and are not consolidated. As a measure of taxation we use the
corporate income tax rate that can be reasonably considered exogenous for
two reasons: i) it is not aﬀected by banks’ choices, as the eﬀective tax rate
would be (the ex-post tax rate); ii) it is not industry-speciﬁc, so that it can
not be said that its level is somewhat determined by policy makers by taking
into consideration how it will aﬀect the banking sector.
The main novelty of the paper lies in a comprehensive analysis of the
eﬀect of tax-shifts on all income statement components. This helps us to
assess the eﬀects among the diﬀerent customers. For example, we try to
understand not only if the net interest margin (the diﬀerence between the
interests received from borrowers and those paid to depositors) is aﬀected by
the level of the corporate income tax levied on banks’ proﬁts, but also if the
possible tax shifting is against depositors or borrowers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section
discusses how bank proﬁtability and taxation evolved in the period under
examination. Section 3 presents a simple theoretical model on the eﬀect
of the corporate income tax on bank proﬁtability. Section 4 presents the
econometric model and the empirical results. The last section summarizes
the main conclusions.
32 Some facts on bank proﬁtability and taxa-
tion
Since the mid-eighties, dramatic changes in regulation, demand composition
and technology have modiﬁed the structure and the boundaries of credit
markets.3 All these changes have strengthened competition, especially in the
traditional lending activity, reduced intermediation margins and stimulated
banks to diversify their sources of revenues and increase eﬃciency in produc-
tion and distribution. The introduction of the euro has eliminated most of
the residual barriers to competition among the banking system of the coun-
tries that have adopted the common currency.4 However, the taxation of
banking in Europe is far from being integrated: the overall ﬁscal treatment
of banks remains the purview of national authorities, subject to European
directives and regulations that impose minimum standards on their policies
(Huizinga, 1999).
The aim of this section is to investigate if changes in the corporate income
tax brackets (CIT rate, from now on) may have inﬂuenced some pattern that
we observe in the banking industry. For example, since the mid-nineties
cross-country variability of both gross income and proﬁt before taxes (as a
percentage of total assets) has decreased in the euro area (Fig. 1a). This fact
matches with the convergence of corporate income taxation among main Euro
area countries (Fig. 2a). On the other hand, when we include in the analysis
Anglo-Saxon banking systems both the dispersion in bank proﬁtability (Fig.
1b) and taxation (Fig. 2b) remain ample, even if the CIT rate declined
considerably everywhere.
Tables 1 and 2 show the main macroeconomic and bank indicators divid-
ing the sample in two sub-periods: 1981-1992 and 1993-2003. Strong diﬀer-
ences in the two periods emerge not only in the real and ﬁnancial indicators
but also in the CIT rate.
The inﬂation rate has been sharply decreasing in every country considered
(see Table 1). The sharpest declines are observable in the euro area, where
inﬂation went down from an average of 6.7 in the years 1981-1992 down
to 2.5 per cent in the years 1993-2003. This is largely connected with the
3We can think, for example, of the liberalization of branching in Italy in 1990 (Ciocca,
2000), of the abolition of geographical constraints to banking activity in the US after the
introduction of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Eﬃciency Act in 1994
(Berger, Kashyap and Scalise, 1995). For an analysis of credit market deregulation on
banking activity see, among others, Bhattacharya, Boot and Thakor (1998).
4Berger, DeYoung and Udell (2000) stress the fact that linguistic, cultural, regulation
diﬀerences, and long distance coordination problems may still counterbalance the beneﬁt
of cross-country consolidation activity.
4convergence process towards the adoption of the single currency. Within the
euro area the most visible shrinking has been recorded in those countries,
like Italy, where the inﬂation rate started from the highest levels.
Following the behavior of the inﬂation rate, interest rates also show a
marked decline. It is even more important to point out that the diﬀerence
between the short-term lending rate and the deposit rate (the spread) also
declined. The spread is often taken as a proxy for the level of competition in
the national banking industry. Its reduction reﬂects the process of deregula-
tion of the banking sector which came together with the ﬁnancial stabiliza-
tion. This indicator remains still above that registered in the Anglo-Saxon
countries.
Financial stabilization and deregulation had important implications on
the income statements of banks. First, there has been a shift from net interest
income to other income not depending on traditional ﬁnancial intermediation.
Following the reduction in the spread, net interest income, as a percentage
of total assets, declined sharply in the euro area while it remained stable in
the United States and in United Kingdom (see Table 2).5
On the contrary, non-interest income has increased its importance in the
last years (Fig. 3a). The decline in interest margins has changed the tradi-
tional role of banks and has forced them to search for new sources of revenues
such as trading, services and other ﬁnancial operations. Diversiﬁcation has
been sustained by the greater propensity of households to invest in ﬁnan-
cial assets other than government bonds, and by the higher opportunities
for ﬁrms to access the capital markets. Moreover, structural changes like
industry deregulation, new information technologies and ﬁnancial innovation
have increased the importance of fee income.6 The ratio between non-interest
income and gross income has increased sharply in every country considered.
The smallest increase is observed in United Kingdom, which is where this
ratio started from the highest level. In the United Kingdom, the main Eu-
ropean ﬁnancial market, banks have been traditionally prone to provide dif-
ferent services other than those related to the pure intermediation activity.
In this respect, Italian, German and Spanish banks lag behind (net interest
income is still a large part of their gross income); this could reﬂect the strong
5However, as noted by DeYoung and Rice (2004a) the stability of the net income-
to-total assets ratio in the U.S. basically depends on lending securitization activity that
reduced loan assets by 10 percentage points between 1986 and 2003. In the same period
net interest income as a percentage of gross income decreased by 15 percentage points to
55 per cent.
6DeYoung and Rice (2004b) stress the fact that fee-based activities like trust services,
mutual fund sales and cash management require little or no regulatory capital. This should
allow banks to use a greater “degree of ﬁnancial leverage”.
5lending relationship which is often said to characterize these countries and
the lower development of their stock markets. Given such sharp diﬀerences,
it becomes interesting to check whether these changes have been fostered or
opposed by taxation (we will see that, because of capital requirements, cor-
porate income taxation has an impact on revenue diversiﬁcation); tax-shifts
are indeed dependent on the demand elasticities of each bank product to
price changes, the market power of a bank with respect to her customers and
the eﬀects of ﬁscal change on ﬁrms and households maximizing choices.
Provisions and operating cost show a sharp reduction comparing the two
periods. These income statement components are less likely to be strongly
aﬀected by changes in income taxation. The reduction in the level of pro-
visions is not easy to interpret; it can be seen as a signal of a lower level
of risk faced by banks but also as a less prudent strategy followed by their
managers. The downward trend in operating expenses (ﬁg. 3b) is mainly
due to advances in information, communications and ﬁnancial technologies
that have allowed banks to render many of their traditional services more
eﬃciently (see Albertazzi and Gambacorta, 2005).
Bank proﬁtability (measured by the return on equity, ROE) has slightly
diminished in the euro area, possibly in connection with the increase in com-
petition. In the United Kingdom and the United States, where the banking
system liberalization process started earlier,7 the ROE remains well above
the euro area average. The higher level of proﬁtability of Anglo-Saxon banks
in the past is usually explained by structural factors or by diﬀerent macro-
economic performance. In the past higher proﬁts were due to the greater
capacity of Anglo-Saxon banking systems to diversify their revenues on non-
traditional markets (Bowen, Hoggarth and Pain, 1999) or to expand their
activities on oﬀ-balance sheet items, such as derivatives (Boyd and Gertler,
1993).8 Though the determination of the factors underlying the diﬀerent
7In the United Kingdom, bank despecialization, the reduction of segmentation in the
credit markets and the developing of a more market oriented economy started in the
seventies (Llewelling, 1990). In the United States changes in market regulation, bank or-
ganization and market structures has started in the eighties (Berger, Kashyap and Scalise,
1995).
8According to microeconomic studies, the diﬀerences in the level of proﬁts observed in
the nineties between Anglo-Saxon and European banking systems reﬂect only to a small
extent diﬀerences in the average bank size or eﬃciency. For example, few studies (Berger
and Mester, 1997, and Hughes and Mester, 1998, for the United States; Altunbas, Molineux
and Thornton, 1997, and Schure and Wagenvoort, 1999, for Europe) show that the cost
function has a very ﬂat U shape (with a minimum at about 10 billion US dollars of total
asset). Also managerial eﬃciency (the so-called x-eﬃciency) does not show appreciable
diﬀerences across countries (Berger and Humphrey, 1997, for the United States, Schure
and Wagenvoort, 1999, for Europe).
6level of proﬁtability observed in the two groups of countries is beyond the
scope of this study, we want to underline how taxation could have played a
role in each proﬁt component.
In summary, the structural changes which took place starting from the
mid-eighties, had important eﬀect on the composition of the income state-
ment of the banking sector: the ratio of non interest income to gross in-
come increased, while operating expenses and provisions decreased. In order
to understand whether these facts could have been somehow inﬂuenced by
changes in the corporate income tax, we develop a simple theoretical frame-
work model, whose main predictions will be tested in the empirical section.
3 A theoretical model
In this section we sketch out a simple model that can show what are the
mechanisms by which a change in the economy wide CIT rate can aﬀect the
diﬀerent items of the income statement of banks. It is useful to start with
two preliminary remarks.
The ﬁrst one is that the CIT is not speciﬁc to the banking sector; in
other words the tax burden is on the proﬁts of all ﬁrms, and not just on
banks. Accordingly, a change of the CIT rate will determine distortions on
the choices not only of banks but also of all other corporations. This implies
that the tax shifting can go in both directions: on one hand banks will try
to shift the tax burden by asking higher interest rates on loans and fees or
by paying lower interest rates on deposits; on the other hand, ﬁrms will try
to shift their CIT toward their counterparts, banks included.9
A second remark is that, as it is well known in public economics,10 the CIT
can generate two diﬀerent eﬀects. One is the output substitution eﬀect which
postulates that an increase of the CIT determines a decrease of production
in the incorporated sector.11 On this basis we assume that the demand of
loans faced by banks is a downward sloping function of the CIT tax rate.
The input substitution eﬀect instead is connected with the fact that CIT
can be seen as a tax which makes convenient to substitute equity with other
“inputs”, like labor or debt.
9In principle, we could expect an analogous eﬀect also for depositors. For the sake of
simplicity, we neglect this channel since deposits held by corporations are a small portion
of total deposits (16.5 per cent in the euro area at the end of 2004).
10The classical theoretical reference about the eﬀects of the corporate income tax is
given by the model of Harberger (1962). See Atkinsons and Stiglitz (1980) for a critical
survey.
11The name output substituion eﬀect refers to the fact that such contraction may be
partially compensated by an expansion of the production of the non incorporated sector.
7Let’s consider a bank under monopolistic-competition (for example, the
location of its branches makes its services non-perfect substitutes with those
of its competitors). Such bank faces a downward sloping demand curve for
any service provided which are classiﬁed into loans and other services diﬀer-
ent from loans. Supposing, for the sake of simplicity, linear schedules, the
demand for loans (L) and the demand for other services (S) can be written:12
L = l − liil − lττ
S = s − sff − sττ (1)
In these deﬁnitions, l, li, lb, s, sf, sτ are all positive parameters; il is
the interest rate on loans, f is the fee required on other services; τ is the
(economy-wide) CIT rate. These two demand functions are decreasing in the
relevant price (il and f, respectively) and they are also negatively aﬀected
by τ.
The latter term is simply meant to capture the idea that a higher level
of corporate income taxation is in equilibrium associated with a lower level
of investment and of economic activity.13 In other words, allowing lτ and sτ
to be non-null is a short way to capture general equilibrium features of the
problem of tax shifting. As we will show below, this simple change has im-
portant and previously neglected consequences on the theroetical predictions
about the eﬀect of the CIT rate on the income statement of banks.
The parameters li and sf are important since they depends on bank’s
market power in the two segments.
Symmetrically, it can also be assumed that the bank faces the following
schedule of deposit demand by households.14
D = d + diid (2)
12We assume that parameters are such that all these expressions are always non negative.
13This is the ultimate eﬀect of both the input substitution eﬀect and the output substi-
tution eﬀect of the CIT on non ﬁnancial ﬁrms which reduces their propensity to produce
and therefore to invest. In principle lτ and sτ may not be necessarily positive. For ex-
ample, one can argue that an increase in τ may induce ﬁrms to substitute equity with
bank loans or with non-bank debt (which may correspond to an increase in the demand of
fee-generating services). In what follows we consider that these eﬀects are of second order
importance. We will discuss these hypotheses in Section 4.3.
14The aim of this paper is not to determine whether deposits are input or output of
a bank’s production function (see Freixas and Rochet, 1997). Talking about demand of
deposits by savers is a mere terminological convention since in the present context this
distinction is irrelevant.
8The non negative parameter di represents the semi-elasticity of D with
respect to the interest rate paid on deposit (id).
Total operating costs are equal to:
C = Sc + Dc
′ + Lc
′′ + F (3)
where F is the level of ﬁxed costs, c, c′, and c′′ are the constant marginal costs
on other services, deposits, and loans respectively. For the sake of simplicity,
we assume that the marginal cost to carry out the traditional intermediation
activity is zero (c′ = c′′ = 0); moreover, also ﬁxed costs can be normalized
to zero (F = 0).15 This hypothesis simpliﬁes the algebra without any eﬀect
on the main results of the paper and captures the intuitive idea that once
the ﬁxed costs connected with the branch network are paid, an additional
loan (deposit) can be granted (taken) at negligible additional administrative
costs. On the contrary, this is not necessarily true for fee generating services.
Provisions for credit losses are obviously commensurate to the amount
of loans (L), with the parameter al that represent the riskiness of bank’s
portfolio:
A = a + alL (4)
Proﬁt before taxes are deﬁned as:
P = (ilL − idD) + Sf − C − A (5)
The bank has to satisfy a balance sheet constraint according to which
equity (E) and deposits should be equal to the sum of physical assets and
total lending:16
L + K = E + D (6)
In order to limit agency problems bringing to excessive risk taking, the
bank is also subject to minimum capital requirements which are assumed to
15Equation (3) implies a strict separability of the costs of bank activities: we will remove
this simplifying hypothesis in Section 4.3.
16Given their irrelevance with repect to the issues studied, physical assets are neglected
(K = 0).
9be binding:17
E = Lρ (7)
In a spirit similar to Caminal (2003) we introduce a ﬁscal eﬀect of the




P − V E
subject to (1)-(7) (8)
The maximand is a reduced form representation of the objective function
of a bank licence holder who maximizes proﬁts by setting prices taking into
account the gross returns that the bank has to grant to outside equity holders
(V E).18 What is important to point out is that, since outside investors cares
about net returns, V is an increasing function of the CIT τ; for simplicity
we assume that V = φτ where φ ≥ 0 is a direct function of the percentage
of E that is in the hand of outside investors.
To understand how this term inﬂuences the behavior of the management
of the bank (licence holder) consider, for example, a reduction of the CIT
rate. The bank, who is facing an expansion of the demand of loans, has to
decide by how much to increase deposits and equity (capital requirements are
binding). Raising more deposits requires paying a higher id. Raising more
equity requires paying V , which because of the reduction of τ, is now lower.
This objective function provides, therefore, a concise way to introduce in
the model these considerations by requiring the bank’s managers to maxi-
mizes proﬁts while taking into account the ﬁscal wedge imposed by the CIT
between the two sources of funds: deposits and equity.
From the set of constraints and the ﬁrst order conditions of the maxi-
mization problem 8, we get:19
17Banks often hold excess capital in order to manage marginal and unpredictable ﬂuctu-
ations of the requirements which would take their capital below the threshold. However,
in a deterministic world like this one, there would be no reason to hold excess capital
(Bolton and Freixas, 2001).
18Note that if we assumed that the bank simply maximizes net proﬁts we would not
obtain any possible shifting of the bank’s CIT burden. In the expression for net proﬁts
P (1 − τ), the CIT enters as a multiplicative factor which leaves ﬁrst order conditions
unaltered. In that case, the unique eﬀects exerted by τ would be those through L and S.
19Second order conditions are also satisifed. With no eﬀect on the main ﬁndings we
introduced the following restrictions on the intercepts: a = d = 0.
10id = (1 − ρ)
l − alli − τ (lτ + liφρ)
2
￿




2 2li (l − lττ) + di (l + alli − lττ + φρliτ)
2li
￿
di + li (1 − ρ)
2￿
f =
s − sττ + csf
2sf
(9)
It is interesting to see how the optimal level of id, il, and f depend on the
diﬀerent parameters. For example, the optimal id is positively aﬀected by
l: a higher demand of loans (reﬂecting, for example, an increase in expected
proﬁtability) allows the bank to charge higher interest rates on loans but also
it requires it to hold more deposits by increasing their remuneration. For a
symmetric reason, id is negatively aﬀected by τ.
The eﬀect of a higher τ on il is less straightforward since by increasing
the CIT rate, the demand of loans shifts downward (which makes the bank
choose a lower il in order to partially compensate such downward shift); at
the same time, the bank obtains a higher marginal beneﬁt from diminishing
loans and therefore equity (and it does so by increasing il). The sign of the
net eﬀect on the interest rate on loans (il) is ambiguous.
For a large al, which represent a situation in which banks have very risky
portfolios, the bank ﬁnds convenient to increase the optimal interest rate on
loans il. On the other hand, a high il also means lower volumes of loans which
in turn requires less D and a lower id. Accordingly, il and id are positively
and negatively inﬂuenced by al, respectively.
The optimal f increases with c and decreases with sf as intuition would
suggest. It also decreases with τ since a change of the CIT rate also deter-
mines a shift in the demand for ﬁnancial services.
It is interesting to point out the main diﬀerences with respect to Caminal
(2003) who ﬁnd that the CIT on banks is equivalent to a tax on loans which
leaves unaﬀected the interest rate on deposits. First, Caminal (2003) does not
consider that τ also has an impact on loan and other bank services demand.
Second, Caminal considers perfect competition while here we coonsider a
model of monopolistic competition. If we assume perfect competition (i.e. if
we suppose li = di = sf → ∞) the derivative of id with respect to τ tends to
zero, while the derivative od il does not, obtaining results which are coherent
with those of Caminal (2003).
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A =
aldi [l − alli − (lτ + liφρ)τ]
2[di + li (1 − ρ)
2]
(10)
where NII = Lil − Did is the net interest income and OI = Sf is other
income. A ﬁrst result is that NII is positively inﬂuenced by l, the parameter
reﬂecting the level of the general economic conditions. This is in line with
the fact that better economic conditions increase the number of projects
becoming proﬁtable and hence increase the demand for credit (Kashyap,
Stein and Wilcox, 1993). Similarly, we obtain that OI is positively aﬀected
by s that represents all exogenous factors inﬂuencing the demand for ﬁnancial
services (i.e. stock market capitalization and volatility). On the other hand,
OI is negatively aﬀected by sf, the coeﬃcient of elasticity of the demand of
services S, which also is an inverse measure of the bank’s market power in
such segment. Similarly, NII is positively aﬀected by di which is a direct
measure of bank’s market power enjoyed in the market for deposits.20
The model’s interesting predictions concern the eﬀect of τ. By taking the

































aLdi (lτ + liφρ)
2[di + li (1 − ρ)
2]
(11)
The main result to be emphasized is that the eﬀect of a change in τ
on the net interest income can be of either sign. In the case of a cost of
20Because of the combined eﬀect of the CIT and of the capital requirements the sign
eﬀect of an increase of li on NII is ambiguous. However, it can be seen that for τφρ not
too large, such derivative is always negative, as one would expect.





dτNII tends to be negative (positive) for high (low) values of the
CIT rate. The intuition of this result can be easily understood noting that
τ inﬂuences the banks income statement in two ways. First, because of the
capital requirements, an increase in the CIT rate is equivalent to an increase
of the marginal cost of providing loans which always brings to a drop in
their quantity and a rise in their price (this eﬀect is ampliﬁed if the cost of
equity due to regulation (φρ) or the elasticity of loan demand (li) are large).
Second, given lτ > 0, an increase in τ determines a downward shift of the
demand of loans which determines a (further) reduction in the quantity of
loan in equilibrium but also a (compensating) reduction in lending rates.
When the total impact on the price is positive (the cost eﬀect on the price
dominates the demand shift one), we obtain two contrasting forces on the
net interest income: the amount of loans shrinks while their interest rate
increases. What is important to point out is that the price (positive) eﬀect
dominates the quantity (negative) one only for small values of the CIT rate.
In other words, a small τ implies a low overall impact of the cost of equity due
to regulation and is compatibile with a large amount of loans in equilibrium:
in this case an increase in the lending rate has a large impact on NII.
The mechanism is diﬀerent for non interest income since bank services are
not subject to capital requirements. In this case an increase of the CIT rate
determines an immediate reduction of demand for bank services S and this
has a negative eﬀect on OI = Sf. Equation (9) shows that the bank reacts
lowering fees f in order to counterbalance the demand shift; nevertheless the
overall amount of fee-proﬁts Sf at the optimum is reduced. Therefore in our
simple model the sign of the derivative d





2sf > 0, the impact of a marginal increase in τ on OI decreases
as τ gets large.
Finally, both d
dτA and d
dτC do not depend on τ. Both derivaties are
negative meaning that an increase in taxation reduce, other things being
equal, the overall amount of provisions and operating expenses.
4 The empirical evidence
4.1 The econometric model
Following Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2005) we base the econometric analy-















+ θtTt + ηj + εj,t (12)
Index j denotes the countries in the panel, t represents years. Yj,t is
the income statement component examined, Xj,t is a vector of control vari-
ables, Tt is a vector of year-dummies, ηj is an unobservable time-invariant
country eﬀect, and εj,t is a well behaved error term. In particular, Xj,t =
[GDPj,t,DCPIj,t,MMRj,t,LTRj,t,SMCj,t,BLj,t,SMVj,t,TAj,t] where GDPj,t
stands for the real GDP of country j in year t, DCPIj,t is the rate of inﬂa-
tion, MMRj,t is the money market rate, LTRj,t is the long-term government
bond interest rate, SMCj,t is the stock market capitalization divided by GDP,
BLj,t is the total amount of bank loans divided by GDP, SMVj,t is the stock
market volatility, TAj,t is total asset of the entire banking sector. All vari-
ables are taken in logs except interest rates and ratios. See the Appendix for
other details on the dataset.
The emphasis of the analysis is on the term γ1τj,t + γ2τ2
j,t which is the
impact on Yj,t of the corporate income tax rate (τj,t).21 Such component
includes a quadratic term in order to capture non linear eﬀects postulated
by the theoretical model in Section 3. For some of the other regressors
(GDPj,t, SMCj,t, V SMj,t) the theoretical model is able to produce some
prediction which may be tested; the remaining regressors are used as control
variables, coherently with previous studies which analyze the link between
bank proﬁtability and the business cycle.22
The model has been estimated using the GMM estimator suggested by
Arellano and Bond (1991) which ensures eﬃciency and consistency provided
that the residuals do not show serial correlation of order two and that the
instruments used are valid (which is tested for with the Sargan test). Table
3 shows the results for: net interest income, other income, operating costs,
provisions, and proﬁt before tax. While lagged values of the dependent vari-
able are signiﬁcant, those of the regressors turned out to be almost always
not signiﬁcant and were not reported in the table (if not stated diﬀerently).
4.2 Net interest income
The ﬁrst column of Table 4 reports the results for the net interest income. As
already pointed out in the literature, proﬁts obtained by banks in their tra-
21The data used are statutory tax rates which include both the national corporate
income tax and (an average of) the local ones.
22See Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2005) for details and references.
14ditional lending activity are correlated to business cycle indicators like GDP
and long term interest rates. Moreover, they are higher in those countries
where both the ﬁnancial market and the banking sector are more developed.
As shown in the estimation results, both γ′s turn out to be signiﬁcant;
the coeﬃcient for the linear term with a positive sign, while the one for the
quadratic term with a negative sign. In Figure 4, we use the coeﬃcients of





γ2τ). Such expression is decreasing, signiﬁcantly greater than zero for
small levels of τ and signiﬁcantly less than zero for large levels of τ.
Expressions (11) reveals that a necessary condition for this pattern is
that ρφli be suﬃciently large. In other words, the eﬀects of the capital
requirements should be suﬃciently strong.
What is interesting to point out is that these results conﬁrm the idea
that, when analyzing the eﬀects of taxation on banks, it is important to
adopt a general equilibrium approach: τ inﬂuences both banks’ marginal
cost, bacause of the capital requirements, and the intercept of the demand
of loans.
4.3 Non-interest income
The second column of Table 4 shows the results for the non-interest income.
The diagnostic tests are well behaved; one lag only of the dependent variable
is signiﬁcant.
Non interest income is not signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by real GDP ﬂuctua-
tions, coherently with the idea suggested in the literature that these services
constitute an eﬀective tool to stabilize banks proﬁts. Non-interest income
shows a strong negative correlation with long-term interest rates, which may
be connected with the losses of value of ﬁxed rate securities in banks’ portfo-
lios. Finally, it is positively aﬀected by the stock market size and volatility.
The ﬁrst eﬀect is in line with the idea that the possibility to provide diﬀerent
types of banking services included is higher when local ﬁnancial markets are
more developed. The eﬀect of volatility is likely to be connected with the fact
that these services are more needed when uncertainty is higher (portfolio are
more often readjusted and ﬁrms buy more derivatives for hedging purposes).
With regard to the eﬀect of the CIT, it can be seen that both the coeﬃ-
cients associated with τ and its square are signiﬁcant. The marginal eﬀect of
τ may be either negative or positive (for small and large levels of τ, respec-
tively; see ﬁgure 4b). Coherently with the theoretical model, and contrary
to what happens with the net interest income, these coeﬃcients imply an
increasing marginal impact of τ on non-interest income. Moreover, as shown
15in Figure 4, the marginal eﬀect of τ on non-interest income is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero only for small values of τ where it is negative, exactly as
implied by the model. The interpretation is the following: given that capi-
tal requirements do not involve fee-generating activities, the unique way in
which the CIT has an impact on non-interest income is through a shift of
the demand of such services which always brings to a reduction of revenues
(if the demand shifts downward, both the quantity and the price decrease).
4.4 Operating costs
The third column of Table 4 reports the results for the operating costs.
The tests performed do not detect speciﬁcation problems. Two lags of the
dependent variable are included.
As intuition would suggest, operating expenses show a scarce correlation
with the business cycle. They are instead inﬂuenced by inﬂation (probably
in connection with some level of wage indexation, at least in the ﬁrst part
of the sample) and by the level of development of local ﬁnancial markets
(in coherence with the idea that the more sophisticated the services to be
provided, the higher the personnel costs).
As suggested by the theoretical model, only the linear term turns out to
be statistically signiﬁcant and with a negative coeﬃcient. When τ goes up,
the demand for services decreases and the lower fees charged by the banking
sector only partially compensate such shift and operating costs, which are
proportional to S, diminish.
As suggested by alternative model speciﬁcation and coherently with the
theoretical model, the marginal impact of τ on C does not change signiﬁ-
cantly with the level of real economic activity.
4.5 Provisions
The fourth section of Table 3 displays the results for provisions. Credit losses
and readjustment values are negatively correlated with GDP and long-term
interest rates, while they increase with short-term interest rate and stock
market volatility.
The negative sign for GDP is in line with Salas and Saurina (2002),
Arpe et al. (2001), and Laeven and Mainoni (2003): when real economic
conditions improve, banks expect lower future credit losses and diminish
provisions accordingly. The negative impact of long-term interest rate is
related to the fact that such variable (as GDP) tends to rise in periods of
good economic conditions, which are characterized by a smaller probability of
default. Provisions increase with the money market rate, consistently with
16the “ﬁnancial stability hypothesis” (Fisher, 1933; Minsky, 1975 and 1982;
Kindleberger 1978): high interest rates increase the burden for borrowers
and their default probability.
With regard to taxation, the results show that γ1 is negative, as expected
from equation (10), but not signiﬁcant.23
4.6 Proﬁt before taxes
The ﬁnal column of Table 3 presents the results for the proﬁt before taxes.
Given that these are deﬁned as gross income (the sum between net in-
terest income and non-interest income) at the net of operating expenses and
provisions, this regression represents a summary of the previous four.
The tests performed are again well behaved. Two lags of the dependent
variable turns out to be signiﬁcant.
Contrary to what happens when we consider the diﬀerent components
separately, the square of the CIT rate is not statistically signiﬁcant, showing
that the opposite signs of the two relevant coeﬃcients in the regressions for
the net interest income and the non interest income, wash out.
The overall eﬀect of an increase in the CIT rate is an increase in proﬁt
before taxes which shows that banks can shift at least part of the CIT. This
is coherent with ﬁndings of Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2001). As we
emphasized above, for high level of τ banks tend to shift toward buyers of
fee-generating services. On the contrary, for low level of τ banks tend to shift
more toward borrowers and lenders. In the latter case, it becomes interesting
to analyze if depositors or borrowers are bearing the cost of such tax shifting.
This is what next paragraph is about.
4.7 Borrowers or depositors?
As we pointed out in section 4.2, the coeﬃcients γ1 and γ2 in the regression
for net interest income are both signiﬁcant. From Figure 4, it emerges that
for low levels of the CIT rate, a marginal increase in taxation has a positive
eﬀect on the net interest income, which signals tax shifting from bank towards
borrowers and depositors. On the contrary for high levels of the CIT the
bank suﬀers a reduction of the overall amount of proﬁts in the “traditional”
intermediation activity: the negative eﬀect produced directly by the CIT
23The uncertainty on the sign of the derivative dA
dt is consistent with a more general
formulation of the equation for provisions such that, for given L, A can be also considered
a direct function of the interest rate paid on loans: A = a + aLL + aiil. The motivation
for this exressions, which would have left unaltered all the main conclusions of the model,
is that il represents a proxy for the risk faced by the bank in the lending relationship.
17on loan demand and the higher costs of capital requirements more than
compensate a possibile increase of the spread. In other words, for high level
of the CIT rate the price eﬀect is more than compensated by the quantity
eﬀect.
This aim of this section is to shed some light on the price eﬀect. In our
model tax shifting may occurr in two ways: through an increase of the interest
rate on lending (il) or through a decrease in the interests rate on deposits
(id); it is therefore interesting to disentangle the eﬀects on the spread (il−id)
via the mark-up (il − im) and via the mark-down (im − id).
We have therefore estimated the following model:
(ik − im)i,t =
2 ￿
k=1





kYj,t−k + γ1τj,t + θtTt + ηj + εj,t (13)
where the subscript k = (l,d) while im represents the money market in-
terest rate. In dealing with a spread variable, we used as control regres-
sors Yj,t = [∆GDPj,t,(TA/GDP)j,t,MMVj,t],where MMVj,t stands for the
money market volatility. Following equations (9) only the CIT rate in linear
term has been considered (γ2 is never signiﬁcant).
Table 4 shows the results of this exercise. Consistently with the predic-
tion of the dealership model by Ho and Saunders (1981) and its extension by
Angbazo (1997) the mark-up and the mark-down are positively correlated
with higher money market volatility. However, only the eﬀect on the mark-
up is statistically signiﬁcant. The same occurs for the degree of ﬁnancial
deepness of the banking sector, measured by the ratio between total banking
assets and GDP, that tends to reduce mostly the mark-up. Real GDP growth
determines an increase of deposit demand and therefore, other things being
equal, a positive eﬀect on the mark-down. On the contrary the eﬀect of an
increase in real GDP on the lending interest rate, even if positive, is statis-
tically not signiﬁcant. As stressed by Melitz and Pardue (1973) this could
be associated with an increase in self-ﬁnancing that tends to reduce the pro-
portion of bank debt and may counterbalance the positive eﬀect exerted on
lending demand by higher economic activity (Friedman and Kuttner, 1993).
A one per cent increase in the CIT rate increases the spread by 7 basis
points. The eﬀects is more pronounced for borrowers (6 basis points) than
for depositors (1 basis point). This result is coherent with Caminal (2003)
according to which competition and the presence of binding capital require-
ments makes the corporate income tax (essentially a tax on equity) work as a
tax on loans, leaving therefore depositors unaﬀected. As discussed in Section
183 these ﬁndings calls for a situation of perfect competition. In this case even
in our model the derivative of id with respect to τ tends to zero, while the
derivative od il does not, obtaining results which are coherent with those of
Caminal (2003).
Results on the mark-up and the mark-down mirror the ﬁndings for net
interest income (see ﬁgure 4a): since the eﬀect on the spread is independent
of the level of τ,only for high values of the CIT rate the negative eﬀect on the
volume of intermediated funds tend to dominate the positive price eﬀect.24
4.8 Extensions and robustness checks
In order to better understand and to corroborate the results reported above,
we carried out some more speciﬁc investigations and some robustness checks.
4.8.1 Analysis of the tax burden
As shown in the ﬁfth column of table 3, in the equation for the proﬁt before
taxes, the CIT rate turns out to be signiﬁcant and with a positive sign. This
suggests the possibility of banks to shift part of the tax burden.
However, the speciﬁcation adopted does not allow to get a quantitive
appraisal of the extent to which banks are actually able to operate such tax
shifting. A ﬁrst try consists in estimating a regression like equation (12) for
the proﬁt after taxes. The results of this exercise reveal that the CIT rate τi,t
has a negative but non signiﬁcant coeﬃcient (−0.312 with a standard error
of 1.158)25. This means that an increase in taxation is likely to determine
a drop in banks’ proﬁts after taxes which is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero; in other words, this evidence says that banks are able to shift large part
of their tax burden.
An interesting check which can be made at this regard is to see if this
result is inﬂuenced by the market power held by banks which, in the present
dataset, may be (roughly) measured by the interest rate spread. We rerun
the model speciﬁcation (12) for the proﬁt after taxes adding an additional
regressor given by τi,t (il − id)i,t. While the coeﬃcient for τi,t remains not
signiﬁcant (−0.270 with a standard error of 1.170), the one for the interaction
24In order to corroborate results for the mark-up and the mark-down we have reesti-
mated the benchmark model (1) for both the interest received on loans (ilL) and those
paid on deposits (idD). Also in this case the eﬀect of the CIT rate on NII comes via the
interest rate on loans, leaving all the other results unchanged.
25Results are unchanged if we include the quadratic term for τ and we consider the
derivative for any value of τ, as we did for the net interest and the non-interest income.
19term turns out to be signiﬁcant and of the predicted positive sign (0.139 with
a standard error of 0.068).
A better quantiﬁcation of the tax burden for banks may be obtained
by computing the impact on proﬁts of an additional unit of currency of
taxes. Few calculations allows to derive these quantities from the estimated
coeﬃcients of equation (12) for proﬁt before taxes and proﬁt after taxes.26
Figure 5 plots the result of this exercise and shows that if taxes are raised
by one euro, the reduction in banks proﬁt after taxes is a slightly decreasing
function of the CIT rate, which is never signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and
with an average close to 3 cents.
Given that the above calculations are based on an approximation,27 as a
robustness check we tried to corroborate the results by running a regression
for banks proﬁts similar to equation (12) but in which the tax rate has
been substituted by the amount of taxes actually paid.28 It turned out that
while in the regression for the proﬁt after taxes the amount of taxes is not
signiﬁcant (-0.108 with a standard error of 0.137), in the one for proﬁt before
taxes the coeﬃcient is almost equal to one and highly signiﬁcant (0.945 with
a standard error of 0.149).29
To sum up, banks display the ability to shift at least 90 per cent of their
corporate income tax burden, depending also on the competitive pressure
they face. This happens mainly through a reduction in operating costs and
provisions and, though not for very high levels of the CIT rate, an increase of
the net interest income. It is interesting to note that, such tax shifting occurs
even if, at least for low levels of taxations, non-interest income decreases (the
only eﬀect that the CIT rate exerts on this income component is through a
shift of the demand for fee-generating services which always implies a loss of
revenues). Finally, coherently with the predictions of the theoretical model
26Denoting T the amount of tax paid by the bank, we have T = PBTτ which implies
∂T/∂τ = ∂ (τPBT)/∂τ = PBT + τ∂ (PBT)/∂τ. This expression can be used to get the
following derivative ∂PAT/∂T =
βPAT(1−τ)
1+βPBT∗τ , where βPAT = ∂ ln(PAT)/∂τ and βPBT =
∂ ln(PBT)/∂τ.
27The starting equality T = PBTτ is valid for the eﬀective (ex-post) CIT rate, while
the one we use in the regressions, for reasons related to possible problems of endogeneity,
is the ex-ante one.
28Moreover, all variables previously taken in logarithm are left in levels, so that the
coeﬃcient for the taxes can be interpreted as the impact on proﬁts of an additional euro
of taxes.
29This test is also useful in order to corroborate the ﬁndings with respect to another issue
emphasized in the litearture. In fact, Huizinga and Laeven (2005) shows that multinational
ﬁrms engage in substantial international proﬁt shifting activities. This may render the
statutory tax rate not a perfect measure of the taxation actually beared by banks (a
criticism which does not apply to the amount of taxes actually paid).
20(for suﬃciently competitive banking sectors), tax shifting on net interest
income takes place mainly through a rise in the interest rate on loans.
4.8.2 Diﬀerences across periods and groups of countries
In section 2 it has been argued that important structural changes concerning
both the real economy and the banking sector occurred from the ﬁrst part of
the sample (1981-1992) to the second one (1993-2003). For this reason it is
natural to investigate whether the results presented above holds indiﬀerently
across sub-periods. In order to do so we estimated the benchmark model
for all income components by allowing the eﬀect of τj,t and τ2
j,t to diﬀer
between the ﬁrst and the second sub-period. In particular we have inserted







where dt is a dummy
that takes the value of 1 in the period 1993-2003 and 0 elsewhere. It turned
out that both coeﬃcients γ∗
1 and γ∗
2 were not signiﬁcant at conventional levels
in all the equations.
As a second test, we estimated the model by allowing the eﬀect of τj,t and
τ2
j,t to diﬀer between euro area and Anglo-Saxon countries. In this case we
have estimated the benchmark model for all income components by adding










t is a dummy
that takes the value of 1 in the case of the US or the UK. Even in this case
both coeﬃcients γ∗
1 and γ∗
2 were never signiﬁcant at conventional levels.
5 Conclusions
In this study we investigated, both from a theoretical and an empirical per-
spective, how bank proﬁtability is aﬀected by the corporate income tax.
The theoretical model, though extremely simpliﬁed, has shed some light
on the diﬀerent channels through which the CIT operate and how they in-
teract. A ﬁrst “direct” eﬀect is connected with the presence of capital re-
quirements and with the fact that the CIT is a tax on equity: accordingly,
the CIT inﬂuences banks’ behavior by making lending more or less costly.
A second “indirect” channel, not previously emphasized in the literature, is
due to the fact the the CIT is not speciﬁc to the banking sector: accordingly,
the CIT may indirectly inﬂuence banks by moving upward or downward the
corporate demand of loans and of fee-generating services. In other words,
the sign of tax shifting is uncertain a priori since the CIT aﬀects banks and
non ﬁnancial corporations as well.
Both mechanisms determine the presence of non linear relationships which
diﬀer across the diﬀerent components of the bank’s proﬁts. In particular,
21with regard to the net interest income, the indirect channel implies an in-
creasing marginal eﬀect while the direct eﬀect implies a descreasing marginal
eﬀect which may more than compensate the former. With regard to non
interest income, only the indirect eﬀect is relevant (capital requirements do
not involve fee-generating services) so that an increasing marginal eﬀect is
expected. Moreover, the model suggests that the sign of the marginal impact
depends on the level of the CIT rate but also on a set of parameters like the
elasticity of the demand of loans and of other banking services. All these
predictions ﬁnd support in the evidence produced in the empirical section.
A further examination consisted in checking whether the eﬀect on net
interest income derives from the interests paid to depositors or from those
received from borrowers. Conﬁrming the theoretical conjectures put forward
in the literature, at least for suﬃciently competitive banking industries, it
turns out that all the eﬀect is through the interests received from borrowers.
Finally, banks display the ability to shift at least 90 per cent of their
corporate income tax burden, depending also on the competitive pressure
they face. This happens mainly through a reduction in operating costs and
provisions while tax shift on net interest income is more likely to occur for
low level of the CIT rate when the cost of equity due to regulation is low.
No signiﬁcant diﬀerences on the link between bank proﬁtability and taxation
emerges comparing the eighties with the nineties or euro area and anglo-saxon
countries.
22Appendix: technical details on the data
The dataset includes ﬁgures for 10 countries over the period 1981-2003.
We have analyzed 8 euro area countries (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, The
Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Belgium), the United States and the
United Kingdom. Data on income statements (net interest income, non-
interest income, operating costs, provisions, and proﬁt before taxes) and total
assets for the period 1981-2001are taken from OCSE Bank Proﬁtability. For
the period 2002-2003 data have been reconstructed using data from Deutsche
Bundesbank for Germany, Banco de Espana for Spain, Banca d’Italia for
Italy, Dutch National Bank for the Netherlands, Banco de Portugal for Por-
tugal, FDIC for the US and the BankScope database (Fitch-Ibca) for the
remaining countries.
Total lending has been obtained by national harmonized statistics for
countries belonging to the euro area and from IMF Financial Statistics for
United Kingdom and United States. Data on total lending for euro area
countries were not always available on the entire time period. For those
years we have reconstructed them backwards using the growth rates of IMF
statistics ﬁgures.
From IMF Financial Statistics we also obtained a set of macroeconomic
indicators: consumer price index, gross domestic product, the interest rate
paid on long-term government bonds and the money market interest rate.
Data on national stock market capitalization and volatility were collected
from Thomson Financial Datastream. From Institute for Fiscal Studies we
obtained information on statutory tax rates which include both the national
corporate income tax and the local taxes (their average across regions), where
they exist. In the case of Netherlands, where the corporate income tax is
progressive, we used the maximum marginal rate.
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Tables and figures 
  
  Table 1 
Countries 









Stock market  
capitalization/  
GDP (2) 
Volatility in  




Volatility in the  
money market 
(a)            
Lending  
interest rate 
(b)             
Deposit  
interest rate 
(a) (b)  
Spread 
Austria  14.70     0.53     2.45     3.56     86.24     3.36     13.60     7.12     0.10     9.93     3.78     6.15    
Belgium  13.49     0.43     1.96     4.29     67.80     13.01     13.94     8.35     0.12     12.70     6.20     6.51    
France  14.44     0.44     2.17     5.79     82.89     8.73     16.11     10.53     0.07     11.09     5.81     5.28    
Germany  15.10     0.62     2.43     2.94     98.63     10.99     14.65     6.76     0.08     10.88     5.80     5.09    
Italy  8.83     0.45     2.07     9.21     57.87     10.13     19.59     14.85     0.06     16.59     9.61     6.98    
Netherlands   14.42     0.41     2.24     2.59     88.65     28.05     13.58     7.12     0.09     10.35     4.02     6.33    
Portugal   3.34     0.48     2.67     16.09     59.69     9.09     12.72     15.05     0.12     22.55     18.38     4.17    
Spain  5.75     0.35     2.75     8.79     70.67     18.94     15.30     14.24     0.11     14.73     10.58     4.15    
Euro area  11.26     0.46     2.34     6.66     76.55     12.79     14.94     10.50     0.09     13.60     8.02     5.58    
United Kingdom  7.46     0.40     2.14     6.29     87.78     49.99     15.53     11.35     0.12     11.45     10.17     1.28    
United States  18.76     0.44     2.89     4.56     43.57     33.12     17.25     8.64     0.09     10.67     8.63     2.04    
Austria   24.06     0.34     1.87     1.93     100.78     13.17     11.14     3.97     0.08     6.91     2.47     4.45    
Belgium  22.25     0.40     1.98     1.85     83.25     48.75     11.32     4.21     0.09     8.01     3.62     4.40    
France  22.42     0.37     1.82     1.59     82.10     54.48     18.39     4.40     0.10     6.94     3.45     3.49    
Germany  23.44     0.51     1.17     1.88     124.01     36.09     17.46     3.91     0.09     10.10     3.38     6.72    
Italy  18.56     0.46     1.45     3.12     75.07     34.38     21.94     6.10     0.10     8.77     3.88     4.88    
Netherlands  22.90     0.35     2.34     2.62     122.63     117.90     16.76     3.90     0.09     5.88     3.27     2.60    
Portugal  10.10     0.37     2.08     3.73     96.08     38.57     13.75     6.12     0.10     9.20     5.15     4.05    
Spain  13.44     0.35     2.77     3.40     88.22     42.32     18.67     5.76     0.11     6.74     4.49     2.25    
Euro area  19.65     0.39     1.94     2.51     96.52     48.21     16.18     4.80     0.09     7.82     3.71     4.10    
United Kingdom  14.74     0.31     2.77     2.31     126.23     130.29     16.65     5.39     0.10     5.63     2.98     2.65    
United States  31.38     0.39     3.14     2.49     43.58     96.53     19.55     4.28     0.09     7.27     4.41     2.86    
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from International Financial Statistics. 
Note: (1) Thousands euros for all countries except United States (thousands Dollars) and United Kingdom (thousands Sterling Pounds).   (2) Data for Portugal refers to 1990 1992; those for Spain to 
1987 1992.  
Main economic indicators 
(1993 2003) 
(1981 1992) 
(percentage values)   Table 2 
Countries 
(a)                
Net Interest  
Income 
(b)               










(f)       
Provisions 
(g)=(c) (e) (f)                 




(i)= (g) (h)     
Profit after  
tax 
(h)/(g) 
ROE            
(1) 
Austria   1.62     0.64     0.28           2.26     1.46     0.52     0.28     0.16     0.12     0.57     13.54    
Belgium (2)  1.64     0.41     0.20           2.05     1.41     0.34     0.30     0.12     0.18     0.39     5.96    
France  2.09     0.50     0.19           2.59     1.88     0.30     0.41     0.14     0.28     0.33     8.13    
Germany  2.26     0.59     0.21           2.85     1.79     0.43     0.63     0.39     0.24     0.62     6.30    
Italy  3.45     1.05     0.23           4.50     2.79     0.76     0.95     0.44     0.51     0.47     9.72    
Netherlands  2.19     0.77     0.26           2.97     1.95     0.41     0.61     0.10     0.51     0.16     10.74    
Portugal  3.28     1.02     0.24           4.29     2.32     1.20     0.77     0.14     0.47     0.22     7.18    
Spain  4.08     0.82     0.17           4.90     3.12     0.77     1.01     0.24     0.77     0.24     8.39    
Euro area  2.58     0.73     0.22           3.30     2.09     0.59     0.62     0.22     0.41     0.35     8.75    
United Kingdom (3)  3.05     1.85     0.38           4.89     3.20     0.97     0.72     0.32     0.40     0.45     8.91    
United States  3.42     1.45     0.30           4.87     3.28     0.74     0.84     0.24     0.60     0.29     9.26    
Austria   1.54     1.15     0.43           2.69     1.81     0.37     0.51     0.07     0.44     0.14     8.07    
Belgium  1.17     0.68     0.37           1.85     1.17     0.19     0.49     0.12     0.37     0.24     10.90    
France  1.04     1.18     0.53           2.22     1.45     0.39     0.38     0.11     0.28     0.28     5.79    
Germany  1.66     0.64     0.28           2.29     1.47     0.41     0.41     0.20     0.21     0.50     4.67    
Italy  2.56     1.03     0.29           3.59     2.24     0.60     0.75     0.36     0.39     0.48     5.20    
Netherlands  1.70     1.07     0.39           2.77     1.90     0.20     0.68     0.19     0.49     0.28     11.52    
Portugal  2.17     0.91     0.29           3.08     1.83     0.46     0.79     0.14     0.65     0.17     7.88    
Spain  2.53     0.99     0.28           3.52     2.11     0.57     0.84     0.17     0.67     0.20     8.20    
Euro area  1.80     0.96     0.35           2.75     1.75     0.40     0.61     0.17     0.44     0.28     7.78    
United Kingdom  2.06     1.48     0.42           3.53     2.11     0.31     1.11     0.36     0.76     0.32     16.16    
United States  3.59     2.39     0.40           5.97     3.66     0.45     1.87     0.60     1.26     0.32     13.88    
Note: (1) Profit after tax as a percentage of capital and reserves.   (2) 1982 1992.   (3) 1984 1992.  
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from OCSE, Bank Profitability. Data for the period 2002 2003 have been reconstructed using data from Deutsche Bundesbank for 
Germany, Banco de Espana for Spain, Banca d'Italia for Italy, Dutch National Bank for the Netherlands, Banco de Portugal for Portugal, FDIC for the US and the BankScope  




(as a percentage of total assets) Table 3
Coeff. S. error Coeff. S. error Coeff. S. error Coeff. S. error Coeff. S. error
Endogenous var. jt 1 0,966      *** 0,075      0,501      *** 0,061      0,782      *** 0,090      0,365      *** 0,080      0,282      *** 0,085     
Endogenous var. jt 2  0,187      ** 0,074       0,206      *** 0,068      0,119      * 0,076      0,266      *** 0,083     
log of real GDP jt 0,436      ** 0,184      0,064      0,432      0,131      0,184       1,999      * 1,091      2,897      ** 1,391     
Inflation ratejt  0,003      0,005      0,009      0,010      0,005      * 0,003      0,041      0,028      0,006      0,035     
Money market rate jt  0,002      0,004      0,010      0,010       0,001      0,003      0,044      * 0,025       0,089      *** 0,031     
Long term rate jt 0,013      ** 0,005       0,019      * 0,012      0,003      0,004       0,066      ** 0,032      0,082      ** 0,040     
Log of total assets  jt 0,038      0,044       0,111      0,102      0,135      *** 0,049      0,397      * 0,229       0,285      0,281     
Lending /GDP jt 0,114      ** 0,058      0,086      0,133      0,130      *** 0,044       0,063      0,337       0,075      0,417     
Stock Mark. Cap. /GDP jt 0,095      *** 0,030      0,078      0,076      0,137      ** 0,029      0,010      0,171      0,355      0,221     
Stock Mark. Volatility jt  0,001      0,001      0,005      * 0,003      0,000      0,001      0,036      *** 0,008       0,033      *** 0,010     
Corporate Income Tax Ratejt 1,967      ** 0,802       4,656      ** 2,038       0,162      * 0,091       0,533      0,739      2,501      *** 0,928     
(Corporate Income Tax Ratejt)
2  2,058      ** 0,838      4,344      ** 2,140     
Sargan test (2nd step; p value)      0,15           0,16           0,16           0,54           0,38     
MA(1), MA(2) (p value)      0,00           0,41           0,00           0,82           0,00           0,63           0,00           0,15           0,00           0,53     
No of countries, no of observations      10           184           10           192           10           184           10           176           10           176     
Operating cost (2) Other income (2)
Regressions Results (1)
Notes: (1) The model is given by equation (1), which includes two lags in order to obtain white noise residuals. Dependent variables are in logarithm. The model has been estimated using the GMM estimator suggested by Arellano 
and Bond (1991) which ensures efficiency and consistency provided that the residuals are not subject to serial correlation of order two and that the instruments used are valid (which is tested for with the Sargan test). The sample goes 










Coeff. S. error Coeff. S. error
Endogenous var. jt 1 0,350      *** 0,072      0,567      *** 0,073     
Endogenous var. jt 2 0,131      ** 0,063     
Real GDP growth rate jt 0,001      0,001      0,003      *** 0,001     
Total bank assets/GDP   jt  0,011      ** 0,005       0,001      0,003     
Money market volatility jt 0,044      *** 0,016      0,014      0,016     
Corporate Income Tax rate jt 0,059      ** 0,027      0,009      0,021     
Sargan test (2nd step; p value)      0,74           0,32     
MA(1), MA(2) (p value)      0,00           0,71           0,00           0,41     
No of countries, no of observations      10           207           10           199     
Regressions results for the spread (1)
Notes: (1) The model is given by equation (1), which includes two lags in order to obtain white noise residuals. The model has been 
estimated using the GMM estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) which ensures efficiency and consistency provided that the 
residuals are not subject to serial correlation of order two and that the instruments used are valid (which is tested for with the Sargan test). 
The sample goes from 1981 to 2003. *Significant at the 10% level. ** Idem, 5%. *** Idem, 1%. Lagged values of the independent variables 
turned out to be not significant and have been removed.
Mark-down= money market rate- 
interest rate on deposits
(ii) (i)
Mark-up= short term interests rate 
on loans - money market rateFigure 1 
Cross-sectional dispersion of bank profitability 
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Source: Coefficients of variation (ratio of cross country standard deviation to simple mean). Authors' calculations 
based on data from OCSE, Bank Profitability. Data for the period 2002 2003 have been reconstructed using data 
from Deutsche Bundesbank for Germany, Banco de Espana for Spain, Banca d'Italia for Italy, Dutch National Bank 
for the Netherlands, Banco de Portugal for Portugal, FDIC for the US and the BankScope database (Fitch Ibca) for 
the remaining countries. Figure 2 
Cross-sectional dispersion of corporate income tax rates 
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Source: Coefficients of variation (ratio of cross country standard deviation to simple mean). Figure 3 
 
(a) Revenue diversification 
 
(b) Cost-to-income ratio 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from OECD, Bank Profitability. Data for the period 2002 2003 
have been reconstructed using data from Deutsche Bundesbank for Germany, Banco de Espana for Spain, 
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Marginal effect of the statutory tax rate (1) 
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(1)  Plots  of  the  derivative  of  each  income  component  with  respect  to  t  ,  the  corporate  income  tax  bracket 
(γ1t+2γ2t j,t). The coefficients γ1 and γ2 are those reported in Table 3. The interval of t chosen is the one included 
between  the  minimum  and  the  maximum  level  of  corporate  income  tax  observed  in  the  sample,  which  are 






















(1) The interval of t chosen is the one included between the minimum and the maximum level of corporate income 
tax observed in the sample, which are respectively 30 and 63 per cent. 
 